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What counts as original appropriation?

University of Arizona, USA, basv{at}email.arizona.edu; basv{at}dds.nl

I here defend historical entitlement theories of property rights against a popular charge. This is the objection that such theories fail because no convincing account of original appropriation exists. I argue that this argument assumes a certain reading of historical entitlement theory and I spell out an alternative reading against which it misfires. On this reading, the role of acts of original appropriation is not to justify but to individuate people’s holdings. I argue that we can identify which acts count as original appropriation against the background of a general justification for a practice of property rights. On this view, what I will call ‘natural’ acts of original appropriation are acts by which a person begins to satisfy the general conditions for justified ownership. Finally, I offer an interpretation of John Locke's theory of appropriation along these lines and argue that it provides an attractive reading of his view.

Key Words: property rights • appropriation • historical entitlement • Locke

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Vol. 8, No. 4, 355-373 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1470594X09343074


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