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<prism:coverDisplayDate>November 2009</prism:coverDisplayDate>
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<title>Politics, Philosophy &amp; Economics</title>
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<title><![CDATA[What counts as original appropriation?]]></title>
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<description><![CDATA[<p>I here defend historical entitlement theories of property rights against a popular charge. This is the objection that such theories fail because no convincing account of original appropriation exists. I argue that this argument assumes a certain reading of historical entitlement theory and I spell out an alternative reading against which it misfires. On this reading, the role of acts of original appropriation is not to justify but to individuate people&rsquo;s holdings. I argue that we can identify which acts count as original appropriation against the background of a general justification for a practice of property rights. On this view, what I will call &lsquo;natural&rsquo; acts of original appropriation are acts by which a person begins to satisfy the general conditions for justified ownership. Finally, I offer an interpretation of John Locke's theory of appropriation along these lines and argue that it provides an attractive reading of his view.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[van der Vossen, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:16:14 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1470594X09343074</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[What counts as original appropriation?]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Murphy Institute of Political Economy</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>373</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>355</prism:startingPage>
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<title><![CDATA[Each outcome is another opportunity: Problems with the Moment of Equal Opportunity]]></title>
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<description><![CDATA[<p>This article introduces the concept of a Moment of Equal Opportunity (MEO): a point in an individual&rsquo;s life at which equal opportunity must be applied and after which it need not. The concept of equal opportunity takes many forms, and not all employ an MEO. However, the more egalitarian a theory of equal opportunity is, the more likely it is to use an MEO. The article discusses various theories of equal opportunity and argues that those that employ an MEO are problematic. Unjust inequalities, those that motivate the use of equal opportunity, occur throughout people&rsquo;s lives and thus go unrectified after an MEO. However, it is not possible to abandon the MEO approach and apply more egalitarian versions of equal opportunity throughout a person&rsquo;s life, since doing so entails problems of epistemology, efficiency, incentives, and counter-intuitive results. The article thus argues that liberal egalitarian theories of equality of opportunity are inconsistent if they support an MEO and unrealizable if they do not.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chambers, C.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:16:14 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1470594X09343066</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Each outcome is another opportunity: Problems with the Moment of Equal Opportunity]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Murphy Institute of Political Economy</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>400</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>374</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Neo-republicanism, freedom as non-domination, and citizen virtue]]></title>
<link>http://ppe.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/401?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article discusses Philip Pettit&rsquo;s neo-republicanism in light of the criterion of self-sustenance: the requirement that a political theory be capable of serving as a self-sustaining public philosophy for a pluralist democracy. It argues that this criterion can only be satisfied by developing an adequate politics of virtue. Pettit&rsquo;s theory is built around the notion of freedom as non-domination, and he does not say much about the virtues of citizens or the policies the state may employ to encourage their development. In order to explain the motivation to comply with republican laws that promote non-domination, Pettit relies on the phenomenon of civility and the mechanism of the intangible hand. But to understand what underlies an adequate level of robust civility one needs to focus on the more basic phenomenon of personal virtue. Policies that aim to promote non-domination should take into account the need to cultivate virtue among citizens, as well as the full range of conditions that favor its exercise.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Costa, M. V.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:16:14 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1470594X09343079</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Neo-republicanism, freedom as non-domination, and citizen virtue]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Murphy Institute of Political Economy</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>419</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>401</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Institutional pluralism and the limits of the market]]></title>
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<description><![CDATA[<p>This paper proposes a theory of institutional pluralism to deal with the question whether and to what extent limits should be placed on the market. It reconceives the pluralist position as it was presented by Michael Walzer and others in several respects. First, it argues that the options on the institutional menu should not be principles of distribution but rather economic mechanisms or &lsquo;modes of provision&rsquo;. This marks a shift from a distributive to a provisional logic. Second, it argues that we should drop the assumption that any good should only be placed in one sphere, i.e. distributed according to one distributive principle. This marks a shift to &lsquo;complex pluralism&rsquo;: for at least some goods it is appropriate that they are provided through the market and through one or more non-market alternatives simultaneously. Finally, it argues that the often used conventionalist justification should be traded for a capability approach to the moral evaluation of markets and non-market alternatives. Any institutional option on our menu has value to the extent that it enhances the morally relevant capabilities of the producers and/or consumers of the good that is to be provided. This approach will be illustrated with two examples of goods for which it yields complex pluralist conclusions: the provision of care and the provision of media content.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Claassen, R. J.G.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 07:16:14 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1470594X09345479</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Institutional pluralism and the limits of the market]]></dc:title>
<dc:publisher>The Murphy Institute of Political Economy</dc:publisher>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>8</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>447</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>420</prism:startingPage>
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